

**Educated Preferences:  
Explaining Attitudes Toward Immigration In Europe**

Jens Hainmueller and Michael J. Hiscox

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**Supplement II:  
Detailed Results from Additional Analysis and Sensitivity Tests**

**A. Introduction**

This supplement to our paper reports the detailed results obtained from additional analysis and from the various tests we performed to check whether our core results were robust to changes in various methodological assumptions and techniques. These results were excluded from the paper itself in order to economize on space. All the data and program files needed to replicate these results are available now from the authors, and will soon be posted on a publicly accessible web page.

Below we simply present the additional results in the order in which they are referenced in our paper. The idea here is to make it easier to refer to the supplement while reading the paper itself. Section references (provided in parentheses below) indicate the location of the reference to these results in the paper. Since all variables and specifications are discussed in the paper itself, we provide few additional comments here.

**B. Ordered Probit Models (Sections III. and V.)**

Table 1 provides results for the re-estimation of the benchmark model (shown in the paper, Table 4) using ordered instead of binary probit models. Note that we do not show the probit coefficients here, because they are not directly interpretable and thus yield little useful information. Instead we provide simulated changes in the predicted probability of having a certain immigration preference that are associated with a change from having completed lower secondary to upper secondary education, and from upper secondary to post secondary education.<sup>1</sup> All other covariates are held at their respective sample means.

[Table 1]

The results clearly show that our results are not driven by the choice of a binary probit. Most importantly, for all answer categories of the dependent variable, the education effects are very similar across source models. Education has a positive effect on *all* types of immigration. For example, going from having completed upper secondary to having completed post-secondary education is associated with a change in the predicted probability of answering “allow many” of

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<sup>1</sup> This corresponds to moving from the 25<sup>th</sup> to the 50<sup>th</sup> and from the 50<sup>th</sup> to the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile of the distribution of educational attainment in the ESS sample.

0.032 (0.030) for immigration from richer European (Non-European) countries and 0.025 (0.034) for immigration from poorer European (Non-European) countries.

The results of the ordered probit also yield strong support for the choice of our primary cut-off point for the binary probit models. Across all four source models, both of the simulated increases in educational attainment have a consistent and significant *negative* impact on the predicted probability of answering “allow few” or “allow many” and a consistent and significant positive impact on the predicted probability to answer “allow some” and “allow many.”

### **C. Country-Specific Estimations Using the Skill345 Measure (Section IV. C)**

Table 2 reports the results from the single country estimations of the effect of skill level (measured by *skill345*) on immigration preferences, using our “benchmark” model. As noted in the paper, here the results are almost identical substantively to those obtained when the measures of education are used: in all but one case (Portugal, in the case of immigration from richer non-European countries) the high skill variable has a positive effect on support for *all* types of immigration (83 of 84 coefficients are positive) and in most countries this effect is highly statistically significant despite the decreased number of observations (80 % of the coefficients are significant). The one coefficient with a negative sign is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Once we estimate this skill effect after replacing the standard income variable with the alternative measure of household income (see fn. 23 in the paper), increasing the sample size markedly for these country-specific models, the skill variable has a positive impact in all countries (84 of 84 estimated coefficients are positive) and in 89% of cases the effect is statistically significant (see the right panel of Table 2).

[Table 2]

### **D. Amended Benchmark Model with Skill345 and Years of Schooling (Section IV.C)**

Table 3 presents the results from the estimations of the amended form of the benchmark model in which *skill345* is included along with *years of schooling*. Again, both the *skill345* and the *years of schooling* seem to pick up different (positive) effects on support for immigration, as both variables are highly significant predictors across all models. Including the skill variable leaves the positive effect of education substantively unaffected. Compared with the results from models without *skill345*, the magnitudes of the education effects in these amended models are only slightly reduced, and the effects are estimated with only slightly reduced precision. That is, very little of the more general education effect appears to be accounted for by skill differences. These findings suggest again that the vast bulk of the education effect on attitudes toward immigration is reflecting other causal factors and not skill effects.

[Table 3]

The same holds true if individual skill dummies are included instead of *skill345*. Again, all except one of the skill dummies have positive and highly significant effects across all models. Most importantly here it is clear that, when we include the more fine-grained indicators of skills, the effect of *years of schooling* on attitudes is not substantively different than when we employed the dichotomous *skill345* measure. Critically, the effects of individual education and skill levels on support for immigrants from richer countries are not significantly different than the corresponding effects on support for immigration from poorer countries.

### **E. Employment Status and Sub-Samples of Respondents (Section IV.D)**

Table 4 reports results from the various labor market sub-samples of respondents (as introduced in Table 8 in the paper). Here we present identical estimations of our benchmark model, but this time incorporating *educational attainment* and *skill*<sup>345</sup> for all the different sub-samples (only the estimated education and skills effects in the different sub-samples are shown in order to economize on space). Recall that if concerns about labor market competition drive immigration preferences, and the link between those preferences and education or skill levels, the results for the out of labor force sub-samples should differ substantially from the benchmark estimates for the sub-sample of those currently in paid work.

[Table 4]

Comparing the results across sub-samples we find the estimated effects of education are very similar, both in terms of magnitude and level of statistical significance, for all models. It does not matter whether we compare those in currently in the labor force paid work with those currently out of the labor force or the unemployed only. The same holds true for the skill variable. The only noticeable differences across sub-samples concern the reduced magnitude and significance of the skill effect in the sub sample of the unemployed that are currently actively looking for work in the two cases involving immigration from poorer countries. Note that this is diametrically opposed to what one would expect based upon a labor-market-competition account (which would suggest that for these poorer-country source models, in which immigrants have lower anticipated levels of skills, the effects should actually be strongest).

### **F. Education, Cultural Values, and Economic Literacy: All Models (Section V)**

Table 5 shows the results from when we re-estimate our benchmark model for all of our four dependent variables and for both educational attainment and years of schooling, incorporating all the cultural values variables and the measure of economic literacy. We are interested here in examining both the associations that these types of variables have with preferences regarding different types of immigration and the degree to which adding these variables reduces the residual effect of education levels on attitudes. Each of the cultural value variables is significantly associated with attitudes toward immigration in all models and enters with large substantive magnitude in the anticipated direction. Whether individuals believe that immigration implies welfare gains for the *economy* as a whole is also significantly related to support for immigration in all models. The residual education effect is quite small (compared with the estimated effect in models that exclude cultural and economic literacy variables) in all cases.

[Table 5]

### **G. Education and Racism: Tests by Employment Status Sub-Samples (Section VI)**

Table 6 presents the results from our tests of whether the connection between education and cultural variables measuring racism and tolerance are driven primarily by labor market concerns. If concerns about job competition generate racism, the estimated effects of education/skills on the variables for those individuals not competing for jobs should differ

substantially from the effects for the sub-sample of those currently in paid work. We estimated models for levels of the *racism*, *antihate*, and *multiculturalism* variables, incorporating *educational attainment* and *skill345* for all the different labor market sub-samples (only the estimated education and skills effects in the different sub-samples are shown in order to save space; each model includes a full set of country dummies and the covariates age and native born). *Racism* is another measure of *racist attitudes* among respondents (coded from 0 to 10), based upon how desirable each individual thinks it is that new immigrants “be white.”<sup>2</sup>

[Table 6]

Comparing the results across sub-samples, the estimated effects of education are very similar, both in terms of magnitude and level of statistical significance, for all models. This is true when we compare those in the labor force with those who are not, and even when we compare effects across smaller subsets of those currently unemployed and those looking for work. In fact, comparing the estimates effects of education across all these sub-samples, there is not a single pair of confidence intervals that do not overlap. The same is true when comparing the estimated effects of skill levels across sub-samples.

#### **H. Allowing for Location-Specific Labor-Market Effects (Section VI)**

Table 7A shows the results from our tests of the so-called “area” model of immigration effects. The aim here is to relax the restriction that the economic threat posed by immigration will be felt equally by respondents regardless of *where* they live in their home country. If we allow that the labor market can be segmented geographically into local markets, the wage effects of immigration (and fears about labor-market competition) may be concentrated in immigrant “gateway communities.” To allow for this possibility, we interacted each of the education variables with the *minority area* variable, which reflects the concentration of ethnic and racial minorities in the area in which the respondent resides.

[Table 7A]

The results are inconclusive at best. Note that the coefficients and standard errors of the interaction and its lower order terms cannot be interpreted directly. We thus provide simulation results in Table 7B. We simulated the education effect for all four source models using educational attainment (models 1-4 in Table 7A). We show the changes in the predicted probability of being pro immigration associated with going from having completed lower secondary to upper secondary education, and from upper secondary to post secondary education,<sup>3</sup> in all three categories of the minority area variable (almost no people of racial or ethnic minorities live in respondent’s area, some people of racial or ethnic minorities, or many people of racial or ethnic minorities). All other covariates are held at their respective sample means.

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<sup>2</sup> This ESS question is: “Please tell me how important you think each of these things should be in deciding whether someone born, brought up and living outside [respondent’s country] should be able to come and live here.” We assess responses to the answer subcategory: “...be white?” It is coded on a scale from 0=extremely unimportant, to 10=extremely important. The ESS includes several questions designed to reveal racist sentiments. We have found that these measures are quite highly correlated, and our choice of a measure related specifically to the race of immigrants (versus minorities in the home countries) makes no difference to the substantive results.

<sup>3</sup> This corresponds with going from the 25<sup>th</sup> to the 50<sup>th</sup> and from the 50<sup>th</sup> to the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile of the distribution of educational attainment.

The results suggest that there is no significant interaction effect between the minority area and the education effect except for the case of immigration from richer European countries, where the impact of education on support for immigration is significantly *weaker* in minority areas than in other locations (though the substantive differences are small). In these latter cases, the effects of education remain positive and substantively large in all areas, which is inconsistent with the expectations from the simple labour market competition account.

[Table 7B]

### I. The “Kitchen Sink” Model with Additional Controls (Section VI)

Tables 8.A and 8.B report results from estimations of our most extensive models. Here we aimed to test whether the core substantive results were affected when we added a comprehensive set of additional control variables to the main benchmark variables and the measures of cultural values we incorporated in the estimations described in sections IV and V of the paper. All these additional variables are described in Table 9 below. We experimented with a variety of “belief” variables (including respondents’ concerns about refugees, free market attitudes, altruism, racism, traditionalism, and the importance attached to equality). We controlled for indicators of trade union membership, religion, and various proxies of social capital and interpersonal trust. And finally we controlled for various measures of economic insecurity or risk, including skill specificity, occupational unemployment, past unemployment, current unemployment, and (an inverse measure of risk) job mobility. The latter measure of mobility, derived from answers to a question about how easy the respondent thought it would be to find another job with a different employer) has a very large percentage of missing values, presumably because only respondents currently in paid work saw it as relevant and many of them were unable to answer. We excluded the mobility measure from one set of estimations (shown in Table 8.A) to preserve the large sample size, and then just repeated the estimations (Table 8.B) with mobility included. None of the added controls affect the main findings: most importantly, all estimated coefficients for the education variables retained their (positive) signs and their significance in all the estimations. The only exceptions are the education coefficients in the poor country source models, which do not reach statistical significance at conventional levels in the reduced sample (8.B). The fact that we get some insignificant education coefficients here does not come as a great surprise since the sample size is greatly reduced and we control for numerous covariates that potentially account for most of what the uncontrolled education coefficient picked up previously. It is also worth noting that, even in this small N sub-sample, the education effects are significant for all models if we calculate country instead of regionally clustered standard errors. And, most importantly, the effects of individual education and skill levels on support for immigrants from richer countries are not significantly different than the corresponding effects on support for immigration from poorer countries.

[Tables 8A, 8B, and 9]

Perhaps the most interesting inclusions in the “kitchen sink” model, from the point of view of the labor-market account, are the various controls for economic insecurity or risk (or its inverse). We conducted separate tests using the key measures and found that, while more educated respondents are less likely to be currently unemployed or to have experienced unemployment in the recent past, and they are also more mobile in the labor market as might be expected, the magnitude of these effects is actually very small. Table 10 reports the results from separate estimations of the measures of past unemployment, current unemployment, and mobility, incorporating *educational attainment* and *skill345*. For example in the full sample estimations,

going from the lowest to the highest level of educational attainment (while holding all other covariates at their means) is estimated to decrease the probability of past (current) unemployment on average by only 0.08 (0.02) – a minuscule effect given the huge dimension of the counterfactual involved. The respective decrease when going from high to low skill is 0.09 (0.02). The picture is very similar with the mobility measure. Again in the full sample estimations for example, a maximum shift in educational attainment is associated with an average increase in stated mobility of about 1.34 on the 10 point mobility scale. The respective increase in mobility when going from low to high skill is only 0.49. Evaluated at the mean level of mobility of 4.02 this is equivalent to a mere 12 % increase. These effects are similar for the sub-sample of those respondents currently in the labor force. Given that the size of these effects is so small, it is understandable that controlling for both variables in the kitchen sink model has a negligible impact on the results of our tests.

[Table 10]

## **J. Regional Fixed Effects in Country-Specific Models (Section VI)**

Finally, we examined the impact of including regional fixed effects in estimations of our benchmark model. The regional fixed effects will help control for a range of unobserved factors (e.g., being located near a border or in economically depressed area) that may affect immigration attitudes. Table 11 reports the results for the single country estimations (this is equivalent to Table 5 in the paper, just adding the regional fixed effects).

[Table 11]

All our substantive findings remain unaffected. Again all 176 of the estimated effects of education are positive, and 167 out of 176 (95%) of these effects are statistically significant (97% are significant if we use the perceived income control rather than the standard measure of income which allows fewer observations). Most importantly, again, in no case is the effect of education on support for immigrants from richer nations significantly smaller (at the 0.99 level) than the corresponding effect for immigrants from poorer nations. The estimated effects of education here are very close in magnitude to the effects we estimated in the single country models without the regional fixed effects (see Table 5 in the paper).

When we plot these marginal effects of education on immigration preferences in each country against per capita GDP (Figure 1) the scissoring of the lines of best fit looks almost identical to the one obtained without the regional fixed effects. Again, education has a larger marginal effect on support for low-skilled rather than high-skilled immigration in the most skill-scarce economies, and the reverse in the most skill-abundant economies, a pattern that makes no sense at all in terms of the labor competition account. This picture looks almost identical regardless of whether we pit the European or the non-European source models against each other.

[Figure 1]

Last but not least we have also re-estimated all our full sample estimations (Tables 4 & 5-10 in the paper) including regional fixed effects in addition to the country fixed effects and the results are substantively identical and available upon request. All in all, the regional fixed effects tests give us a great deal of additional confidence to our core results.

**Table 1: Education and Support for Immigration: Benchmark Results for Full Sample  
(Simulated Changes in Predicted Probabilities from Ordered Probit Models)**

Change in Predicted Probability of having a certain Immigration Preference when going from eduattain=2 (completed lower secondary or second stage of basic education) to eduattain=3 (completed upper secondary) <sup>1</sup>												
	Immigration from Richer Europe			Immigration from Poorer Europe			Immigration from Richer Non European countries			Immigration from Poorer Non European countries		
	Point Estimate	.95 Lower Bound	.95 Upper bound	Point Estimate	.95 Lower Bound	.95 Upper bound	Point Estimate	.95 Lower Bound	.95 Upper bound	Point Estimate	.95 Lower Bound	.95 Upper bound
Change in Pr(y=1) Allow none	-0.022	-0.026	-0.019	-0.020	-0.023	-0.016	-0.027	-0.031	-0.023	-0.025	-0.028	-0.021
Change in Pr(y=2) Allow few	-0.031	-0.031	-0.030	-0.035	-0.035	-0.034	-0.032	-0.032	-0.032	-0.033	-0.033	-0.033
Change in Pr(y=3) Allow some	0.025	0.023	0.026	0.033	0.032	0.035	0.034	0.033	0.036	0.038	0.036	0.039
Change in Pr(y=4): Allow many	0.028	0.025	0.031	0.021	0.018	0.024	0.025	0.022	0.027	0.020	0.017	0.022
Change in Predicted Probability of having a certain Immigration Preference when going from eduattain=3 (completed upper secondary) to eduattain=4 (post secondary, non-tertiary) <sup>1</sup>												
	Immigration from Richer Europe			Immigration from Poorer Europe			Immigration from Richer Non European countries			Immigration from Poorer Non European countries		
	Point Estimate	.95 Lower Bound	.95 Upper bound	Point Estimate	.95 Lower Bound	.95 Upper bound	Point Estimate	.95 Lower Bound	.95 Upper bound	Point Estimate	.95 Lower Bound	.95 Upper bound
Change in Pr(y=1) Allow none	-0.018	-0.021	-0.016	-0.016	-0.019	-0.014	-0.022	-0.025	-0.019	-0.020	-0.023	-0.017
Change in Pr(y=2) Allow few	-0.032	-0.033	-0.031	-0.037	-0.037	-0.036	-0.035	-0.036	-0.035	-0.037	-0.037	-0.036
Change in Pr(y=3) Allow some	0.018	0.017	0.020	0.027	0.026	0.029	0.028	0.026	0.029	0.033	0.031	0.034
Change in Pr(y=4): Allow many	0.032	0.028	0.037	0.025	0.022	0.029	0.030	0.026	0.034	0.024	0.021	0.027

1. Simulated changes in predicted probabilities (plus robust confidence bounds) based on the benchmark model estimated as described in the paper (Table 4) but using ordered instead of binary probit. All other covariates except educational attainment are held at their respective sample means.

**Table 2: Effects of Skill on Immigration Preferences – Country Specific Estimates**

Dependent Variable: <sup>1</sup> Favor Immigration from ...	Skill345 Coefficients: restricted single country models (using income)				Obs. (avg)	Skill345 Coefficients: extended single country models (using perceived income) <sup>2</sup>				Obs. (avg)
	Richer Europe	Poorer Europe	Richer Outside	Poorer Outside		Richer Europe	Poorer Europe	Richer Outside	Poorer Outside	
Country										
Luxembourg	0.203*** (0.064)	0.209*** (0.063)	0.213*** (0.065)	0.176*** (0.065)	329	0.122** (0.057)	0.125** (0.058)	0.160*** (0.058)	0.101* (0.058)	444
Norway	0.191*** (0.030)	0.089*** (0.025)	0.199*** (0.037)	0.126*** (0.030)	1149	0.214*** (0.028)	0.107*** (0.024)	0.219*** (0.032)	0.149*** (0.026)	1172
Ireland	0.098** (0.041)	0.133*** (0.034)	0.115*** (0.027)	0.131*** (0.027)	800	0.120** (0.051)	0.114*** (0.018)	0.134*** (0.032)	0.127*** (0.017)	894
Denmark	0.136*** (0.036)	0.125*** (0.030)	0.157*** (0.039)	0.137*** (0.034)	784	0.143*** (0.028)	0.129*** (0.024)	0.160*** (0.036)	0.136*** (0.027)	856
Switzerland	0.156*** (0.051)	0.136*** (0.036)	0.151*** (0.016)	0.152*** (0.024)	955	0.198*** (0.044)	0.164*** (0.035)	0.166*** (0.024)	0.157*** (0.026)	1126
Austria	0.089** (0.041)	0.095*** (0.033)	0.117*** (0.029)	0.119*** (0.034)	692	0.098*** (0.031)	0.113*** (0.033)	0.119*** (0.025)	0.116*** (0.027)	976
Netherlands	0.102*** (0.039)	0.141*** (0.040)	0.107*** (0.036)	0.162*** (0.041)	1142	0.108*** (0.032)	0.141*** (0.037)	0.113*** (0.030)	0.156*** (0.035)	1248
Belgium	0.142*** (0.031)	0.140*** (0.013)	0.150*** (0.038)	0.136*** (0.014)	707	0.160*** (0.029)	0.174*** (0.001)	0.175*** (0.032)	0.182*** (0.011)	809
Germany	0.075** (0.032)	0.102*** (0.019)	0.079*** (0.027)	0.097*** (0.018)	1105	0.078** (0.031)	0.119*** (0.011)	0.079*** (0.030)	0.102*** (0.018)	1301
Finland	0.205*** (0.009)	0.137*** (0.022)	0.218*** (0.015)	0.157*** (0.039)	976	0.198*** (0.007)	0.127*** (0.023)	0.209*** (0.015)	0.148*** (0.034)	1021
Italy	0.151** (0.065)	0.103 (0.068)	0.151* (0.078)	0.196*** (0.063)	273	0.128** (0.061)	0.094** (0.047)	0.099 (0.064)	0.153*** (0.050)	453
United Kingdom	0.221*** (0.035)	0.182*** (0.037)	0.165*** (0.042)	0.135*** (0.040)	906	0.256*** (0.032)	0.207*** (0.037)	0.195*** (0.037)	0.166*** (0.041)	992
Sweden	0.164*** (0.013)	0.082*** (0.014)	0.181*** (0.023)	0.083*** (0.021)	1110	0.171*** (0.016)	0.074*** (0.014)	0.185*** (0.021)	0.071*** (0.021)	1129
Israel	0.023 (0.035)	0.078 (0.052)	0.012 (0.026)	0.021 (0.045)	840	0.031 (0.028)	0.097** (0.039)	0.039 (0.026)	0.039 (0.038)	1009
Spain	0.148** (0.069)	0.113* (0.064)	0.126* (0.070)	0.107 (0.067)	372	0.169*** (0.063)	0.126* (0.066)	0.129* (0.067)	0.104* (0.060)	557
Portugal	0.032 (0.119)	0.016 (0.110)	-0.003 (0.149)	0.011 (0.103)	439	0.062 (0.070)	0.050 (0.070)	0.021 (0.084)	0.042 (0.060)	591
Greece	0.045 (0.060)	0.063*** (0.024)	0.007 (0.062)	0.066*** (0.025)	605	0.101** (0.046)	0.086*** (0.020)	0.075* (0.045)	0.077*** (0.019)	791
Slovenia	0.053 (0.043)	0.083 (0.071)	0.043 (0.058)	0.083 (0.062)	480	0.070** (0.034)	0.100* (0.057)	0.069 (0.052)	0.098* (0.054)	529
Czech Republic	0.155*** (0.041)	0.156** (0.062)	0.111** (0.053)	0.112* (0.062)	419	0.117*** (0.040)	0.142*** (0.050)	0.088* (0.047)	0.079** (0.038)	569
Hungary	0.126** (0.051)	0.043 (0.037)	0.098** (0.043)	0.067** (0.031)	535	0.154*** (0.036)	0.078*** (0.030)	0.120*** (0.036)	0.069*** (0.022)	604
Poland	0.094** (0.039)	0.194*** (0.039)	0.131*** (0.044)	0.193*** (0.040)	665	0.122*** (0.040)	0.193*** (0.038)	0.148*** (0.035)	0.204*** (0.036)	781
Total (of 21) Positive Coeff.	21	21	20	21		21	21	21	21	
Total sig. (p<.10)	17	16	17	17		19	20	17	19	

1. Probit estimations: coefficients are estimated marginal effects ( $\partial F/\partial x_k$ ), i.e. the marginal effect on  $\Pr(y=1)$  given a unit increase in the value of the relevant (continuous) regressor ( $x_k$ ), holding all other regressors at their respective sample means. The discrete change in the probability is reported for binary regressors. Robust standard errors, adjusted for potential regional clustering, in parentheses. \* p<0.10 \*\* p<0.05 \*\*\* p<0.01. Each model is estimated using a full set of benchmark controls (coefficients not shown here). Cases weighted by DWEIGHT. France is omitted here because no skill data is available.

2. In these models the *income* variable, the central bottleneck in terms of number of observations for most countries, is replaced by a variable measuring satisfaction with the current level of household income. The latter variable (see text fn. 23 for discussion) yields on average about 20-40% more observations per country

**Table 3: Skill-level, Education, and Immigration Attitudes by Source:  
Full ESS Sample**

Dependent variable: Favor Immigration from...	High/Low Skill Distinction and Educational Attainment				Disaggregated Skill Levels and Educational Attainment			
	Richer European	Poorer European	Richer Countries Outside Europe	Poorer Countries Outside Europe	Richer European	Poorer European	Richer Countries Outside Europe	Poorer Countries Outside Europe
Model No. <sup>1</sup>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
schooling	0.018*** (0.002)	0.019*** (0.002)	0.018*** (0.002)	0.021*** (0.002)	0.016*** (0.002)	0.018*** (0.002)	0.017*** (0.002)	0.020*** (0.002)
Skill345	0.094*** (0.011)	0.085*** (0.010)	0.090*** (0.012)	0.085*** (0.010)				
skill2					0.041** (0.020)	0.011 (0.019)	0.011 (0.020)	0.020 (0.020)
skill3					0.115*** (0.024)	0.081*** (0.020)	0.084*** (0.024)	0.087*** (0.021)
skill4					0.159*** (0.021)	0.127*** (0.021)	0.133*** (0.024)	0.135*** (0.024)
skill5					0.114*** (0.020)	0.087*** (0.022)	0.091*** (0.022)	0.099*** (0.022)
age	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)
gender	-0.033*** (0.012)	0.022** (0.010)	-0.013 (0.011)	0.026** (0.011)	-0.033*** (0.012)	0.022** (0.010)	-0.013 (0.011)	0.027** (0.011)
income	0.016*** (0.003)	0.014*** (0.003)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.003)	0.016*** (0.003)	0.014*** (0.003)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)
native	-0.064*** (0.020)	-0.073*** (0.019)	-0.069*** (0.019)	-0.063*** (0.019)	-0.064*** (0.020)	-0.073*** (0.019)	-0.068*** (0.019)	-0.063*** (0.019)
minority area	0.007 (0.010)	0.036*** (0.010)	0.005 (0.010)	0.031*** (0.009)	0.007 (0.010)	0.036*** (0.010)	0.005 (0.010)	0.032*** (0.009)
partisan right	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.022*** (0.003)	-0.008*** (0.003)	-0.024*** (0.003)	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.022*** (0.003)	-0.008*** (0.003)	-0.024*** (0.003)
Observations	24942	25072	24887	24967	24942	25072	24887	24967
Log likelihood	-15307.07	-15284.28	-15649.12	-15518.78	-15290.58	-15276.30	-15639.96	-15509.85
Pseudo R-squared	0.07	0.10	0.07	0.10	0.07	0.10	0.08	0.10

1. Probit estimations: coefficients are estimated marginal effects ( $\partial F/\partial x_k$ ), i.e. the marginal effect on  $\Pr(y=1)$  given a unit increase in the value of the relevant (continuous) regressor ( $x_k$ ), holding all other regressors at their respective sample means. The discrete change in the probability is reported for binary regressors. Robust standard errors, adjusted for potential regional clustering, in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$  \*\*  $p < 0.05$  \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Each model includes a full set of country dummies (coefficients not shown here). Cases weighted by DWEIGHT and PWEIGHT.

**Table 4: Skill-level, Education, and Attitudes by Source: Employment Status Sub-Samples**

	Dependent Variable <sup>1</sup> : Favor Immigration from ...			
	Richer European	Poorer European	Richer Countries Outside Europe	Poorer Countries Outside Europe
<b>Full ESS sample</b>				
educational attainment	0.050*** (0.006)	0.052*** (0.006)	0.050*** (0.006)	0.053*** (0.006)
Skill345	0.089*** (0.013)	0.083*** (0.012)	0.085*** (0.013)	0.085*** (0.011)
Observations	24996	25126	24941	25021
Log likelihood	-15355.29	-15345.64	-15698.06	-15599.89
Pseudo R-squared	0.07	0.10	0.07	0.09
<b>In Labor Force Sample<sup>2</sup></b>				
educational attainment	0.057*** (0.006)	0.054*** (0.007)	0.053*** (0.006)	0.053*** (0.007)
Skill345	0.078*** (0.015)	0.078*** (0.013)	0.075*** (0.015)	0.083*** (0.012)
Observations	16467	16531	16435	16471
Log likelihood	-9859.27	-9937.04	-10166.40	-10196.59
Pseudo R-squared	0.08	0.10	0.07	0.09
<b>Out of Labor Force Sample<sup>3</sup></b>				
educational attainment	0.041*** (0.009)	0.047*** (0.010)	0.046*** (0.011)	0.055*** (0.011)
Skill345	0.110*** (0.021)	0.095*** (0.023)	0.103*** (0.024)	0.089*** (0.022)
Observations	8529	8595	8506	8550
Log likelihood	-5451.62	-5372.16	-5494.34	-5372.18
Pseudo R-squared	0.06	0.09	0.07	0.09
<b>Unemployed (all)</b>				
educational attainment	0.074*** (0.021)	0.052*** (0.018)	0.055*** (0.019)	0.068*** (0.017)
Skill345	0.108** (0.049)	0.090** (0.043)	0.151*** (0.051)	0.113** (0.045)
Observations	1331	1334	1322	1325
Log likelihood	-824.81	-823.81	-819.28	-823.41
Pseudo R-squared	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.10
<b>Unemployed and Actively Looking for Work</b>				
educational attainment	0.080*** (0.026)	0.063** (0.025)	0.077*** (0.026)	0.104*** (0.025)
Skill345	0.060 (0.056)	-0.006 (0.059)	0.103* (0.058)	0.050 (0.061)
Observations	869	873	868	867
Log likelihood	-540.29	-529.69	-534.99	-522.48
Pseudo R-squared	0.09	0.12	0.10	0.13

1. Probit estimations: coefficients are estimated marginal effects ( $\partial F/\partial x_k$ ), i.e. the marginal effect on  $\Pr(y=1)$  given a unit increase in the value of the relevant (continuous) regressor ( $x_k$ ), holding all other regressors at their respective sample means. The discrete change in the probability is reported for binary regressors. Robust standard errors, adjusted for potential regional clustering, in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$  \*\*  $p < 0.05$  \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Each model includes a full set of benchmark controls and country dummies (coefficients not shown here). Cases weighted by DWEIGHT and PWEIGHT.

2. Includes those currently employed in paid work and those temporarily unemployed.

3. Includes those permanently disabled or retired, students, and those doing housework and caring for children at home.

**Table 5: Education, Cultural Tolerance, and Economic Literacy**

	Dependent Variable: Favor Immigration from:							
	Richer European	Poorer European	Richer Countries Outside Europe	Poorer Countries Outside Europe	Richer European	Poorer European	Richer Countries Outside Europe	Poorer Countries Outside Europe
Model No. <sup>1</sup>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
educational attainment	0.029*** (0.005)	0.019*** (0.006)	0.025*** (0.006)	0.021*** (0.007)				
Schooling					0.010*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)
Antihate	0.010*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)
Multiculturalism	0.037*** (0.006)	0.063*** (0.006)	0.050*** (0.006)	0.068*** (0.007)	0.038*** (0.006)	0.063*** (0.006)	0.050*** (0.007)	0.068*** (0.007)
immigrant friends	0.028*** (0.009)	0.051*** (0.010)	0.029*** (0.010)	0.052*** (0.011)	0.027*** (0.009)	0.049*** (0.010)	0.027*** (0.009)	0.051*** (0.010)
Culture	0.021*** (0.004)	0.035*** (0.004)	0.022*** (0.004)	0.039*** (0.004)	0.021*** (0.003)	0.035*** (0.004)	0.022*** (0.004)	0.038*** (0.004)
Crime	-0.013*** (0.005)	-0.030*** (0.005)	-0.018*** (0.005)	-0.038*** (0.005)	-0.013*** (0.005)	-0.030*** (0.005)	-0.018*** (0.005)	-0.038*** (0.004)
Economy	0.033*** (0.003)	0.042*** (0.003)	0.038*** (0.004)	0.039*** (0.003)	0.033*** (0.003)	0.042*** (0.003)	0.038*** (0.004)	0.039*** (0.003)
skill345	0.058*** (0.013)	0.036*** (0.011)	0.052*** (0.014)	0.036*** (0.012)	0.064*** (0.012)	0.039*** (0.011)	0.056*** (0.013)	0.035*** (0.011)
Age	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001* (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)
Gender	-0.036*** (0.013)	0.024** (0.010)	-0.020 (0.013)	0.025** (0.011)	-0.035*** (0.013)	0.025*** (0.010)	-0.019 (0.012)	0.027** (0.011)
Income	0.012*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.008** (0.004)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.008** (0.004)
Native	0.011 (0.022)	0.053*** (0.020)	0.010 (0.022)	0.047** (0.022)	0.008 (0.021)	0.051** (0.020)	0.007 (0.023)	0.045** (0.021)
minority area	-0.000 (0.010)	0.023** (0.010)	-0.005 (0.011)	0.017* (0.009)	0.001 (0.010)	0.024** (0.010)	-0.004 (0.011)	0.018** (0.009)
partisan right	0.003 (0.003)	-0.011*** (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.012*** (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.011*** (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.012*** (0.003)
Observations	22877	22965	22843	22894	22834	22922	22800	22850
Log likelihood	-13087.44	-12232.75	-13243.94	-12426.18	-13061.45	-12196.27	-13216.50	-12383.67
Pseudo R-squared	0.13	0.21	0.14	0.21	0.13	0.21	0.14	0.21

1. Probit estimations: coefficients are estimated marginal effects ( $\partial F/\partial x_k$ ), i.e. the marginal effect on  $\Pr(y=1)$  given a unit increase in the value of the relevant (continuous) regressor ( $x_k$ ), holding all other regressors at their respective sample means. The discrete change in the probability is reported for binary regressors. Robust standard errors, adjusted for potential regional clustering, in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$  \*\*  $p < 0.05$  \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Each model includes a full set of country dummies (coefficients not shown here). Cases weighted by DWEIGHT and PWEIGHT.

**Table 6: Education and Racism: Tests by Employment Status Sub-Samples**

Dependent variable:	How stable is the link between education and racism across subgroups? <sup>1</sup>						How stable is the link between skills and racism across subgroups? <sup>1</sup>						
	racism		antihate		multiculturalism		racism		antihate		multiculturalism		
Question:	Qualification for immigration: be white?		Law against promoting racial or ethnic hatred good/bad for a country?		Better for a country if almost everyone share customs and traditions?		Qualification for immigration: be white?		Law against promoting racial or ethnic hatred good/bad for a country?		Better for a country if almost everyone share customs and traditions?		
Coded:	0= Extremely Unimportant 10= Extremely Important		0=Extremely bad 10=Extremely Good		1= Agree strongly 5= Disagree Strongly		0= Extremely Unimportant 10= Extremely Important		0=Extremely bad 10=Extremely Good		1= Agree strongly 5= Disagree Strongly		
Mean:	2.34		7.13		2.63		2.34		7.13		2.63		
SD:	2.83		3.01		1.08		2.83		3.01		1.08		
	Point Estimate	99% Conf. Interval	Point Estimate	99% Conf. Interval	Point Estimate	99% Conf. Interval	Point Estimate	99% Conf. Interval	Point Estimate	99% Conf. Interval	Point Estimate	99% Conf. Interval	
<b>Full Sample</b>													
<i>Educational Attainment</i>	-0.314*** (0.020)	-0.366 -0.262	0.223*** (0.022)	0.166 0.281	0.141*** (0.006)	0.125 0.158	<i>skill345</i>	-0.718*** (0.054)	-0.850 -0.570	0.489*** (0.067)	0.316 0.663	0.338*** (0.019)	0.289 0.387
Observations	40833		39403		41029		Observations	34476		33367		34636	
R-squared	0.12		0.05		0.12		R-squared	0.11		0.05		0.12	
<b>In Labor Force Sample<sup>2</sup></b>													
<i>Educational Attainment</i>	-0.319*** (0.026)	-0.387 -0.252	0.263*** (0.029)	0.187 0.338	0.160*** (0.010)	0.133 0.187	<i>skill345</i>	-0.718*** (0.066)	-0.889 -0.546	0.550*** (0.072)	0.364 0.737	0.361*** (0.024)	0.299 0.422
Observations	23696		23222		23762		Observations	22167		21724		22230	
R-squared	0.09		0.06		0.10		R-squared	0.09		0.06		0.10	
<b>Out of Labor Force Sample<sup>3</sup></b>													
<i>Educational Attainment</i>	-0.296*** (0.026)	-0.364 -0.229	0.188*** (0.035)	0.098 0.279	0.109*** (0.010)	0.084 0.134	<i>skill345</i>	-0.653*** (0.102)	-0.918 -0.388	0.377*** (0.107)	0.098 0.655	0.245*** (0.037)	0.148 0.341
Observations	17137		16181		17267		Observations	12309		11643		12406	
R-squared	0.13		0.04		0.13		R-squared	0.12		0.04		0.13	
<b>Unemployed (all)</b>													
<i>Educational Attainment</i>	-0.383*** (0.064)	-0.549 -0.217	0.237*** (0.072)	0.049 0.425	0.139*** (0.036)	0.046 0.232	<i>skill345</i>	-0.776*** (0.213)	-1.330 -0.222	0.657** (0.255)	-0.006 1.321	0.326*** (0.080)	0.119 0.533
Observations	2250		2190		2266		Observations	1857		1813		1872	
R-squared	0.07		0.07		0.08		R-squared	0.05		0.04		0.09	
<b>Unemployed and Actively Looking for Work</b>													
<i>Educational Attainment</i>	-0.327*** (0.078)	-0.530 -0.125	0.283*** (0.093)	0.042 0.523	0.117*** (0.042)	0.007 0.226	<i>skill345</i>	-0.581* (0.311)	-1.390 0.229	0.720** (0.349)	-0.188 1.629	0.274** (0.106)	-0.002 0.550
Observations	1437		1407		1442		Observations	1212		1192		1216	
R-squared	0.09		0.07		0.08		R-squared	0.06		0.06		0.09	

1. OLS Regressions: Regression coefficients shown with robust standard errors, adjusted for potential regional clustering, in parentheses. \* p<0.10 \*\* p<0.05 \*\*\* p<0.01. Each model includes a full set of country dummies and the covariates age and native born (coefficients not shown here). Cases weighted by DWEIGHT and PWEIGHT.

2. Includes those currently employed in paid work and those temporarily unemployed.

3. Includes those permanently disabled or retired, students, and those doing housework and caring for children at home.

**Table 7A: The AREA Model**

	Dependent Variable: Favor Immigration from:							
	Richer European	Poorer European	Richer Countries Outside Europe	Poorer Countries Outside Europe	Richer European	Poorer European	Richer Countries Outside Europe	Poorer Countries Outside Europe
Model No. <sup>1</sup>	1	2	3	4				
educational attainment	0.085*** (0.011)	0.078*** (0.011)	0.077*** (0.010)	0.072*** (0.011)				
schooling					0.029*** (0.004)	0.024*** (0.004)	0.029*** (0.004)	0.023*** (0.004)
age	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.003*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)
gender	-0.047*** (0.013)	0.008 (0.011)	-0.027** (0.012)	0.006 (0.012)	-0.045*** (0.013)	0.012 (0.011)	-0.024** (0.012)	0.011 (0.012)
income	0.019*** (0.003)	0.015*** (0.003)	0.016*** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.021*** (0.003)	0.017*** (0.003)	0.017*** (0.003)	0.014*** (0.003)
native	-0.086*** (0.018)	-0.097*** (0.022)	-0.079*** (0.016)	-0.084*** (0.022)	-0.088*** (0.017)	-0.101*** (0.021)	-0.080*** (0.015)	-0.087*** (0.020)
minority area	0.050*** (0.017)	0.062*** (0.019)	0.032* (0.019)	0.048** (0.021)	0.063** (0.027)	0.049* (0.029)	0.046 (0.029)	0.022 (0.030)
partisan right	-0.005* (0.003)	-0.021*** (0.003)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.023*** (0.003)	-0.005* (0.003)	-0.021*** (0.003)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.023*** (0.003)
educational attainment * minority area	-0.015** (0.007)	-0.011 (0.007)	-0.009 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.007)				
schooling * minority area					-0.005* (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
	28733	28878	28671	28761	28648	28795	28586	28677
Observations	-17787.81	-17796.09	-18137.61	-18052.41	-17761.60	-17758.84	-18102.72	-17982.36
Log likelihood	0.07	0.09	0.07	0.09	0.07	0.09	0.07	0.09
Pseudo R-squared	0.085***	0.078***	0.077***	0.072***				

1. Probit estimations: coefficients are estimated marginal effects ( $\partial F/\partial x_k$ ), i.e. the marginal effect on  $\Pr(y=1)$  given a unit increase in the value of the relevant (continuous) regressor ( $x_k$ ), holding all other regressors at their respective sample means. The discrete change in the probability is reported for binary regressors. Robust standard errors, adjusted for potential regional clustering, in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$  \*\*  $p < 0.05$  \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Each model includes a full set of country dummies (coefficients not shown here). Cases weighted by DWEIGHT and PWEIGHT.

**Table 7B: The Education Effect in Different Minority Areas**

(Simulated Changes in Predicted Probabilities for the AREA Model)

	Change in Predicted Probability of Being Pro Immigration when going from eduattain=2 (completed lower secondary or second stage of basic education) to eduattain=3 (completed upper secondary) <sup>1</sup>			Change in Predicted Probability of Being Pro Immigration when going from eduattain=3 (completed upper secondary) to eduattain=4 (post secondary, non-tertiary) <sup>1</sup>		
	Point Estimate	.95 Lower Bound	.95 Upper Bound	Point Estimate	.95 Lower Bound	.95 Upper Bound
<b>Immigration from Richer Europe</b>						
Area: almost nobody of minority race or ethnic group	0.072	0.061	0.083	0.069	0.059	0.079
Area: some of minority race or ethnic group	0.056	0.046	0.067	0.054	0.044	0.064
Area: many of minority race or ethnic group	0.040	0.019	0.061	0.039	0.020	0.059
<b>Immigration from Poorer Europe</b>						
Area: almost nobody of minority race or ethnic group	0.069	0.058	0.080	0.067	0.056	0.078
Area: some of minority race or ethnic group	0.057	0.044	0.070	0.055	0.043	0.067
Area: many of minority race or ethnic group	0.045	0.021	0.068	0.043	0.021	0.066
<b>Immigration from Richer Non European Countries</b>						
Area: almost nobody of minority race or ethnic group	0.069	0.057	0.081	0.068	0.056	0.079
Area: some of minority race or ethnic group	0.060	0.050	0.070	0.059	0.049	0.069
Area: many of minority race or ethnic group	0.051	0.033	0.069	0.050	0.032	0.068
<b>Immigration from Poorer Non European Countries</b>						
Area: almost nobody of minority race or ethnic group	0.065	0.055	0.076	0.065	0.055	0.076
Area: some of minority race or ethnic group	0.059	0.047	0.071	0.058	0.047	0.070
Area: many of minority race or ethnic group	0.052	0.028	0.076	0.051	0.028	0.074

1. Simulated changes in predicted probabilities (plus robust confidence bounds) based on models 1-4 in table 7A. All other covariates (except educational attainment and minority area) are held at their respective sample means.

**Table 8.A: The “Kitchen Sink” Model**

Model No. <sup>1</sup>	Dependent Variable: Favor Immigration from:							
	Richer European	Poorer European	Richer Countries Outside Europe	Poorer Countries Outside Europe	Richer European	Poorer European	Richer Countries Outside Europe	Poorer Countries Outside Europe
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
educational attainment	0.023*** (0.007)	0.017*** (0.007)	0.021*** (0.007)	0.018** (0.008)				
schooling					0.008*** (0.003)	0.007*** (0.003)	0.007*** (0.003)	0.008** (0.003)
racism	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.016*** (0.003)	-0.012*** (0.003)	-0.020*** (0.003)	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.017*** (0.003)	-0.013*** (0.003)	-0.021*** (0.003)
crime	-0.010* (0.005)	-0.026*** (0.005)	-0.017*** (0.004)	-0.034*** (0.005)	-0.010* (0.005)	-0.026*** (0.005)	-0.017*** (0.004)	-0.033*** (0.005)
antihate	0.011*** (0.002)	0.007** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)	0.011*** (0.002)	0.007** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)
culture	0.016*** (0.004)	0.026*** (0.004)	0.015*** (0.004)	0.028*** (0.005)	0.016*** (0.004)	0.027*** (0.004)	0.015*** (0.004)	0.029*** (0.005)
multiculturalism	0.034*** (0.007)	0.049*** (0.008)	0.037*** (0.007)	0.048*** (0.009)	0.033*** (0.007)	0.049*** (0.007)	0.036*** (0.008)	0.047*** (0.009)
economy	0.027*** (0.003)	0.030*** (0.003)	0.028*** (0.004)	0.024*** (0.004)	0.026*** (0.003)	0.030*** (0.003)	0.028*** (0.004)	0.024*** (0.004)
skill345	0.048*** (0.014)	0.016 (0.015)	0.051*** (0.016)	0.008 (0.015)	0.054*** (0.014)	0.017 (0.015)	0.056*** (0.016)	0.008 (0.014)
age	0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
gender	-0.039** (0.015)	0.004 (0.014)	-0.035** (0.016)	0.003 (0.013)	-0.036** (0.015)	0.008 (0.013)	-0.035** (0.015)	0.006 (0.013)
income	0.011*** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.003)	0.009** (0.004)	0.009** (0.004)	0.012*** (0.003)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.009** (0.004)	0.009** (0.004)
native	-0.014 (0.023)	0.047* (0.027)	0.006 (0.030)	0.063** (0.028)	-0.016 (0.023)	0.046* (0.027)	0.005 (0.030)	0.062** (0.028)
immigrant_friends	0.028*** (0.010)	0.035** (0.014)	0.025** (0.011)	0.044*** (0.013)	0.027*** (0.011)	0.034** (0.013)	0.024** (0.011)	0.042*** (0.013)
minority_area	-0.004 (0.012)	0.021* (0.012)	-0.005 (0.013)	0.013 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.012)	0.023* (0.012)	-0.003 (0.013)	0.014 (0.010)
partisan_right	0.010*** (0.003)	0.000 (0.004)	0.010*** (0.003)	-0.004 (0.004)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.000 (0.004)	0.011*** (0.003)	-0.004 (0.004)
social trust	0.006** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.005 (0.003)	0.006 (0.004)	0.005** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.005 (0.003)	0.006 (0.004)
pro free market attitude	0.006 (0.006)	0.003 (0.008)	-0.009* (0.006)	0.003 (0.008)	0.006 (0.005)	0.003 (0.008)	-0.009 (0.006)	0.003 (0.008)
equality	0.016** (0.008)	0.036*** (0.007)	0.013** (0.007)	0.043*** (0.006)	0.015** (0.008)	0.035*** (0.007)	0.012* (0.007)	0.041*** (0.006)
altruism	-0.013* (0.007)	0.001 (0.007)	-0.011 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.013* (0.007)	0.001 (0.007)	-0.011 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.010)
traditionalism	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.005)
religious	0.005* (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)
Social capital 1	0.000 (0.006)	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.009)	-0.015* (0.008)	0.001 (0.006)	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.015* (0.008)
Social capital 2	0.010* (0.006)	-0.001 (0.008)	0.005 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.008)	0.010* (0.006)	-0.001 (0.008)	0.006 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.008)
refugee1 (applications generous)	0.033*** (0.008)	0.076*** (0.007)	0.056*** (0.009)	0.096*** (0.007)	0.033*** (0.008)	0.077*** (0.008)	0.056*** (0.008)	0.097*** (0.007)
refugee2 (fairs hare)	0.041*** (0.009)	0.071*** (0.010)	0.046*** (0.009)	0.082*** (0.008)	0.042*** (0.009)	0.070*** (0.010)	0.046*** (0.009)	0.082*** (0.008)
trade union membership	0.013 (0.017)	0.031* (0.018)	-0.005 (0.021)	0.022 (0.020)	0.016 (0.017)	0.035** (0.018)	-0.002 (0.021)	0.025 (0.020)
skill specificity (TI&DS)	-0.017** (0.008)	-0.012 (0.009)	-0.013* (0.008)	-0.017* (0.009)	-0.017** (0.008)	-0.011 (0.009)	-0.013* (0.008)	-0.016* (0.008)
Unemployment rate (97-03), by ISCO88-3digit level	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Comparative disadvantage	-0.055 (0.060)	0.002 (0.064)	-0.033 (0.052)	-0.013 (0.055)	-0.052 (0.060)	0.007 (0.064)	-0.028 (0.051)	-0.008 (0.055)
comparative advantage	-0.047 (0.058)	-0.039 (0.068)	-0.016 (0.054)	-0.038 (0.060)	-0.040 (0.058)	-0.034 (0.068)	-0.008 (0.053)	-0.031 (0.060)
non-tradeable sector	-0.048 (0.056)	0.009 (0.064)	-0.022 (0.058)	0.000 (0.056)	-0.043 (0.057)	0.014 (0.064)	-0.016 (0.058)	0.005 (0.057)
Labor Market Risk 1 (Past Unemployment)	0.014 (0.017)	-0.003 (0.018)	-0.007 (0.019)	-0.015 (0.018)	0.014 (0.017)	-0.003 (0.018)	-0.006 (0.019)	-0.016 (0.019)
Labor Market Risk 2 (Current Unemployment)	-0.014 (0.035)	-0.016 (0.036)	-0.015 (0.034)	-0.013 (0.033)	-0.012 (0.035)	-0.013 (0.036)	-0.013 (0.034)	-0.010 (0.032)
Observations	15000	15043	14993	15011	15014	15058	15006	15024
Log likelihood	-8376.05	-7515.08	-8456.04	-7525.49	-8380.47	-7505.62	-8460.04	-7519.70
Pseudo R-squared	0.16	0.26	0.17	0.27	0.16	0.26	0.17	0.27

1. Probit estimations: coefficients are estimated marginal effects ( $\partial F/\partial x_k$ ), i.e. the marginal effect on  $\Pr(y=1)$  given a unit increase in the value of the relevant (continuous) regressor ( $x_k$ ), holding all other regressors at their respective sample means. The discrete change in the probability is reported for binary regressors. Robust standard errors, adjusted for potential regional clustering, in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$  \*\*  $p < 0.05$  \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Each model includes a full set of country dummies (coefficients not shown here). Cases weighted by DWEIGHT and PWEIGHT.

**Table 8.B: The “Kitchen Sink” Model**

Model No. <sup>1</sup>	Dependent Variable: Favor Immigration from:							
	Richer European	Poorer European	Richer Countries Outside Europe	Poorer Countries Outside Europe	Richer European	Poorer European	Richer Countries Outside Europe	Poorer Countries Outside Europe
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
educational attainment	0.022*** (0.008)	0.012 (0.010)	0.020** (0.009)	0.005 (0.009)				
schooling					0.008*** (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.008** (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)
racism	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.016*** (0.004)	-0.010** (0.005)	-0.020*** (0.004)	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.016*** (0.004)	-0.010** (0.005)	-0.020*** (0.004)
crime	-0.010* (0.006)	-0.029*** (0.008)	-0.016*** (0.005)	-0.035*** (0.007)	-0.009 (0.006)	-0.028*** (0.008)	-0.016*** (0.005)	-0.034*** (0.007)
antihate	0.010*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.006* (0.003)	0.011*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.011*** (0.002)	0.006* (0.003)
culture	0.006 (0.007)	0.021*** (0.006)	0.003 (0.007)	0.027*** (0.007)	0.007 (0.007)	0.022*** (0.006)	0.004 (0.007)	0.027*** (0.007)
multiculturalism	0.038*** (0.009)	0.053*** (0.010)	0.046*** (0.011)	0.055*** (0.011)	0.036*** (0.009)	0.051*** (0.010)	0.044*** (0.011)	0.053*** (0.010)
economy	0.031*** (0.004)	0.028*** (0.005)	0.030*** (0.005)	0.018*** (0.005)	0.031*** (0.004)	0.028*** (0.005)	0.029*** (0.005)	0.018*** (0.006)
skill345	0.034 (0.021)	0.007 (0.021)	0.040* (0.023)	0.012 (0.017)	0.036* (0.021)	0.009 (0.023)	0.042* (0.022)	0.008 (0.017)
age	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
gender	-0.029 (0.022)	0.016 (0.022)	-0.026 (0.023)	0.003 (0.017)	-0.025 (0.022)	0.021 (0.022)	-0.021 (0.023)	0.008 (0.017)
income	0.019*** (0.005)	0.013*** (0.005)	0.014** (0.006)	0.006 (0.006)	0.020*** (0.005)	0.014*** (0.005)	0.015*** (0.005)	0.007 (0.006)
native	0.028 (0.027)	0.056* (0.030)	0.028 (0.036)	0.052 (0.037)	0.024 (0.027)	0.053* (0.030)	0.025 (0.036)	0.052 (0.036)
immigrant_friends	0.025* (0.013)	0.022 (0.018)	0.018 (0.013)	0.029* (0.017)	0.022* (0.013)	0.020 (0.018)	0.015 (0.013)	0.026 (0.017)
minority_area	-0.014 (0.014)	0.007 (0.017)	-0.018 (0.017)	-0.011 (0.014)	-0.010 (0.014)	0.011 (0.017)	-0.014 (0.017)	-0.008 (0.014)
partisan_right	0.005 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.005)	0.008 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.006)	0.005 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.005)	0.008* (0.005)	-0.007 (0.006)
social trust	0.005 (0.003)	0.012*** (0.004)	0.003 (0.005)	0.004 (0.005)	0.005 (0.003)	0.013*** (0.004)	0.004 (0.005)	0.004 (0.005)
pro free market attitude	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.009)	-0.019** (0.008)	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.009)	-0.019** (0.008)	-0.006 (0.009)
equality	0.019* (0.010)	0.026*** (0.009)	0.024** (0.010)	0.044*** (0.009)	0.018* (0.010)	0.027*** (0.008)	0.024** (0.012)	0.044*** (0.009)
altruism	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.010)	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.010)
traditionalism	-0.012 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.016* (0.009)	-0.000 (0.007)	-0.013 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.017** (0.008)	-0.001 (0.007)
religious	0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.004)
Social capital 1	0.008 (0.008)	0.008 (0.010)	0.006 (0.011)	0.013 (0.012)	0.010 (0.008)	0.012 (0.010)	0.008 (0.011)	0.016 (0.011)
Social capital 2	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.011 (0.009)	-0.007 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.016* (0.009)	-0.011 (0.009)	-0.007 (0.010)
refugee1 (applications generous)	0.032*** (0.009)	0.074*** (0.011)	0.056*** (0.011)	0.097*** (0.011)	0.032*** (0.009)	0.075*** (0.011)	0.055*** (0.011)	0.098*** (0.011)
refugee2 (fairs hare)	0.041*** (0.011)	0.081*** (0.013)	0.058*** (0.012)	0.106*** (0.014)	0.039*** (0.011)	0.080*** (0.013)	0.056*** (0.012)	0.105*** (0.014)
trade union membership	0.034 (0.021)	0.029 (0.023)	0.011 (0.022)	0.029 (0.023)	0.039* (0.021)	0.035 (0.023)	0.016 (0.022)	0.033 (0.023)
skill specificity (TI&DS)	-0.029*** (0.010)	-0.014 (0.013)	-0.019* (0.010)	-0.023 (0.014)	-0.028*** (0.010)	-0.015 (0.013)	-0.019* (0.010)	-0.022 (0.014)
Unemployment rate (97-03), by ISCO88-3digit level	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Comparative disadvantage	-0.010 (0.067)	0.062 (0.058)	-0.065 (0.083)	0.010 (0.067)	-0.003 (0.065)	0.067 (0.057)	-0.057 (0.081)	0.013 (0.066)
comparative advantage	-0.027 (0.075)	-0.012 (0.069)	-0.058 (0.091)	-0.070 (0.078)	-0.018 (0.073)	-0.006 (0.068)	-0.047 (0.090)	-0.065 (0.078)
non-tradeable sector	-0.023 (0.072)	0.051 (0.067)	-0.045 (0.091)	-0.003 (0.074)	-0.015 (0.071)	0.055 (0.068)	-0.038 (0.091)	-0.001 (0.075)
Labor Market Risk 1 (Past Unemployment)	-0.016 (0.026)	-0.026 (0.025)	-0.035 (0.027)	-0.018 (0.024)	-0.013 (0.026)	-0.023 (0.025)	-0.032 (0.027)	-0.014 (0.024)
Labor Market Risk 2 (Current Unemployment)	0.217*** (0.054)	0.038 (0.139)	0.149* (0.090)	-0.091 (0.111)	0.213*** (0.055)	0.032 (0.140)	0.142 (0.093)	-0.097 (0.111)
Labor Market Risk 3 (Mobility)	0.008** (0.004)	0.006* (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.009** (0.004)	0.007** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)
Observations	8145	8159	8142	8145	8159	8174	8156	8159
Log likelihood	-4402.46	-3967.45	-4491.62	-3943.41	-4399.14	-3964.30	-4490.84	-3941.18
Pseudo R-squared	0.16	0.26	0.17	0.28	0.16	0.26	0.18	0.29

1. Probit estimations: coefficients are estimated marginal effects ( $\partial F/\partial x_i$ ), i.e. the marginal effect on  $\Pr(y=1)$  given a unit increase in the value of the relevant (continuous) regressor ( $x_i$ ), holding all other regressors at their respective sample means. The discrete change in the probability is reported for binary regressors. Robust standard errors, adjusted for potential regional clustering, in parentheses. \*  $p<0.10$  \*\*  $p<0.05$  \*\*\*  $p<0.01$ . Each model includes a full set of country dummies (coefficients not shown here). Cases weighted by DWEIGHT and PWEIGHT.

**Table 9: The Additional Control Variables used in the “Kitchen Sink” Model**

Name	Concept	Measured
social trust	Social Trust	“Using this card, generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can’t be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted.”
pro free market attitude	Free Market Attitude	“Using this card, please say to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. The less that government intervenes in the economy, the better it is for [country].” Answers are coded on a scale from 1 [Agree strongly] to 5 [Disagree Strongly]. We have recoded this variable along more intuitive lines.
Equality	Equality Values	To what extent does the following statement describe your values: “It is important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities.” Answers are coded from 1 [Very much like me] to 5 [not like me at all]. We have recoded this variable along more intuitive lines.
Racism	Racism Proxy	“Please tell me how important you think each of these things should be in deciding whether someone born, brought up and living outside [respondent’s country] should be able to come and live here.” “...be white?” This variable is coded on a scale from 0=extremely unimportant, to 10=extremely important.
Altruism	Altruistic Values	To what extent does the following statement describe your values: “It is important to help people and care for others well-being.” Answers are coded from 1 [Very much like me] to 5 [not like me at all]. We have recoded this variable along more intuitive lines.
Traditionalism	Traditional Values	To what extent does the following statement describe your values: “It is important to follow traditions and customs.” Answers are coded from 1 [Very much like me] to 5 [not like me at all]. We have recoded this variable along more intuitive lines.
Religious	Religious Beliefs	“Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are?” Answers are coded on a scale from 0 [Not at all religious] to 10 [Very Religious].
social capital 1	Social Capital/Networks 1	“Compared to other people of your age, how often would you say you take part in social activities?” Answers are coded from 1 [Much less than most] to 5 [Much more than most].
social capital 2	Social Capital/Networks 1	If for some reason you were in serious financial difficulties and had to borrow money to make ends meet, how difficult or easy would that be? Answers are coded from 1 [Very difficult] to 5 [Very easy]
refugee1	Concern for Refugees I	“Using this card, please say how much you agree or disagree with the following statements: The government should be generous in judging people’s applications for refugee status.” Answers are coded from 1 [Agree strongly] to 5 [Disagree Strongly]. We have recoded this variable along more intuitive lines.
refugee2	Concern for Refugees II	“Using this card, please say how much you agree or disagree with the following statements: [country] has more than its fair share of people applying for refugee status.” Answers are coded from 1 [Agree strongly] to 5 [Disagree Strongly].
trade union membership	Trade Union Membership	“Are you currently member of a trade union?” Coded 1 [Yes] and 0 [No]
skill specificity (TI&DS)	Skill Specificity – Iversen and Soskice Index	Skill specificity indicator operationalized as suggested by Torben Iversen & David Soskice in their <i>APSR</i> article “An Asset Theory of Social Policy Preferences” (Iversen & Soskice 2001). This indicator exploits the skill-based hierarchical structure of the “International Standard Classifications of Occupations (ISCO-88)”, i.e. it compare the share of unit groups in any higher level class to the share of the workforce in that class (see their appendix for details).
unemployment rate (97-03), by ISCO88-3digit level	Personal Unemployment Rate	Unemployment rates at the 3-digit ISCO-88 level (average 1997-2002). Calculations based on OECD data. This variable was generously provided to us by Philipp Rehm (Duke University).
comparative disadvantage	Employment in sector that has a comparative disadvantage	Coded 1 [Yes] and 0 [No]. This variable is based on matching of NACE codes in dataset with ‘International Trade by Commodity Statistics’ (OECD) (average 1999-2002). Adjusting for a countries’ overall trade-imbalance, sectors that export more than they import are said to have a comparative advantage. Calculations based on logic described in Mayda & Rodrik 2002. This variable was generously provided to us by Philipp Rehm (Duke University).
comparative advantage	Employment in sectors that has a comparative advantage	Coded 1 [Yes] and 0 [No]. This variable is based on matching of NACE codes in dataset with ‘International Trade by Commodity Statistics’ (OECD) (average 1999-2002). Adjusting for a countries’ overall trade-imbalance, sectors that export more than they import are said to have a comparative advantage. Calculations based on logic described in Mayda & Rodrik 2002. This variable was generously provided to us by Philipp Rehm (Duke University).
non-tradeable sector	Employment in non-tradeable sector	Coded 1 [Yes] and 0 [No]. This variable is based on matching of NACE codes in dataset with ‘International Trade by Commodity Statistics’ (OECD) (average 1999-2002). Adjusting for a countries’ overall trade-imbalance, sectors that export more than they import are said to have a comparative advantage. Calculations based on logic described in Mayda & Rodrik 2002. NACE codes 37, and 41 + (but not 74) are coded as non-tradeable. This variable was generously provided to us by Philipp Rehm (Duke University).
Labor Market Risk 1 (Past Unemployment)	Past Unemployment	“Ever unemployed and seeking work for a period more than three months?” Coded 1=Yes; 0=No
Labor Market Risk 2 (Current Unemployment)	Current Unemployment	“Currently unemployed and looking for a job” Coded 1=Yes; 0=No
Labor Market Risk 3 (Mobility)	Mobility	How easy or difficult is it for you to get a similar or better job with another employer? 10=Extremely Easy; 0=Extremely Difficult

**Table 10: Education, Skills, Mobility and Job Insecurity**

Dependent variable:	Labour Market Risk 1 (Past Unemployment)				Labour Market Risk 2 (Current Unemployment)				Labour Market Risk 3 (Mobility)								
Question:	Ever unemployed and seeking work for a period more than three months				Question	Currently unemployed and looking for work				Question	How easy or difficult is it for you to get a similar or better job with another employer?						
Coded:	1=YES 0=NO				Coded	1=YES 0=NO				Coded	10=Extremely Easy; 0=Extremely Difficult						
Mean:	0.268				Mean	0.043				Mean	4.02						
SD:	0.442				SD:	0.204				SD:	2.978						
Models No. <sup>1</sup>	1A			1B			2A			2B			3A			3B	
	Point Estimate	Shift in Pr(Y=1) associated with Min-Max Shift in Covar.		Point Estimate	Shift in Pr(Y=1) associated with Min-Max Shift in Covar.		Point Estimate	Shift in Pr(Y=1) associated with Min-Max Shift in Covar.		Point Estimate	Shift in Pr(Y=1) associated with Min-Max Shift in Covar.		Point Estimate	Shift in mobility scale associated with Min-Max Shift in Covar.		Point Estimate	Shift in mobility scale associated with Min-Max Shift in Covar.
<b>Full Sample</b>																	
<i>Educational Attainment</i>	-0.044*** (0.011)	-0.077	<i>skill345</i>	-0.304*** (0.026)	-0.09	<i>Educational Attainment</i>	-0.089*** (0.014)	-0.023	<i>skill345</i>	-0.372*** (0.053)	-0.02	<i>Educational Attainment</i>	0.224*** (0.027)	1.345	<i>skill345</i>	0.487*** (0.072)	(see left)
Obs	41467		Obs	35027		Obs	41695		Obs	35121		Obs	18112		Obs	17158	
R <sup>2</sup>	0.06		R <sup>2</sup>	0.07		R <sup>2</sup>	0.09		R <sup>2</sup>	0.1		R <sup>2</sup>	0.16		R <sup>2</sup>	0.17	
<b>In Labor Force sample<sup>2</sup></b>																	
<i>Educational Attainment</i>	-0.088*** (0.014)	-0.182	<i>skill345</i>	-0.360*** (0.031)	-0.119	<i>Educational Attainment</i>				<i>Educational Attainment</i>	0.223*** (0.028)	1.337	<i>skill345</i>	0.503*** (0.073)	(see left)		
Obs	23942		Obs	22418		Obs			Obs	17424		Obs	16590		Obs	16590	
R <sup>2</sup>	0.05		R <sup>2</sup>	0.05		R <sup>2</sup>			R <sup>2</sup>	0.16		R <sup>2</sup>	0.17		R <sup>2</sup>	0.17	

1. Models no 1 & 2 Probit Estimations and Models 3 OLS Regressions: Probit or regression coefficients are shown alongside simulated shift in the predicted probability Pr(Y=1) when the respective regressor (eduattain or skill345) goes from its sample minimum to the sample maximum, holding the other covariates at their respective sample means. Robust standard errors, adjusted for potential regional clustering, in parentheses. \* p<0.10 \*\* p<0.05 \*\*\* p<0.01. Each model includes a full set of country dummies and the covariates age, age squared, and native born (coefficients not shown here). Cases weighted by DWEIGHT and PWEIGHT.
2. Includes those currently employed in paid work and those temporarily unemployed.


**Table 11: Effects of Education on Immigration Preferences:  
Country-Specific Estimates from Probit (Regional) Fixed Effects Models**

Dependent Variable: <sup>1</sup> Favor Immigration from ...	Educational attainment				Obs. (avg)	Years of schooling				Obs. (avg)
	Richer Europe	Poorer Europe	Richer Outside	Poorer Outside		Richer Europe	Poorer Europe	Richer Outside	Poorer Outside	
Country					Obs. (avg)					Obs. (avg)
Luxembourg	0.052*** (0.014)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.041*** (0.013)	0.037*** (0.013)	700	0.023*** (0.006)	0.018*** (0.006)	0.020*** (0.006)	0.020*** (0.006)	697
Norway	0.081*** (0.016)	0.052*** (0.014)	0.086*** (0.017)	0.067*** (0.013)	1891	0.027*** (0.007)	0.017*** (0.003)	0.031*** (0.005)	0.023*** (0.003)	1913
Ireland	0.051*** (0.007)	0.054*** (0.008)	0.050*** (0.010)	0.049*** (0.009)	1379	0.028*** (0.005)	0.020*** (0.003)	0.026*** (0.005)	0.023*** (0.003)	1350
Denmark	0.089*** (0.012)	0.100*** (0.013)	0.105*** (0.019)	0.088*** (0.013)	1185	0.030*** (0.004)	0.033*** (0.004)	0.033*** (0.006)	0.027*** (0.006)	1185
Switzerland	0.080*** (0.012)	0.046*** (0.014)	0.068*** (0.020)	0.057*** (0.010)	1450	0.032*** (0.002)	0.019*** (0.004)	0.033*** (0.006)	0.020*** (0.008)	1449
Austria	0.067*** (0.013)	0.064*** (0.014)	0.063*** (0.013)	0.054*** (0.016)	1224	0.033*** (0.007)	0.031*** (0.004)	0.026*** (0.005)	0.026*** (0.005)	1208
Netherlands	0.077*** (0.010)	0.066*** (0.009)	0.072*** (0.007)	0.069*** (0.009)	1933	0.019*** (0.004)	0.024*** (0.004)	0.021*** (0.003)	0.022*** (0.003)	1920
Belgium	0.065*** (0.019)	0.065*** (0.003)	0.071*** (0.017)	0.070*** (0.014)	1243	0.025*** (0.009)	0.028*** (0.003)	0.025*** (0.009)	0.032*** (0.006)	1248
Germany	0.056*** (0.011)	0.053*** (0.012)	0.073*** (0.008)	0.058*** (0.012)	2155	0.021*** (0.003)	0.023*** (0.004)	0.028*** (0.004)	0.027*** (0.005)	2152
France	0.051*** (0.009)	0.056*** (0.014)	0.063*** (0.013)	0.050*** (0.011)	1176	0.021*** (0.006)	0.023*** (0.008)	0.028*** (0.007)	0.024*** (0.007)	1163
Finland	0.061*** (0.006)	0.058*** (0.008)	0.059*** (0.008)	0.063*** (0.006)	1679	0.026*** (0.001)	0.026*** (0.003)	0.027*** (0.005)	0.026*** (0.005)	1683
Italy	0.035* (0.019)	0.026 (0.023)	0.039** (0.017)	0.052** (0.021)	503	0.009** (0.004)	0.008 (0.005)	0.011*** (0.004)	0.015*** (0.004)	502
United Kingdom	0.099*** (0.011)	0.108*** (0.013)	0.087*** (0.014)	0.100*** (0.019)	1612	0.039*** (0.006)	0.036*** (0.005)	0.031*** (0.004)	0.034*** (0.005)	1605
Sweden	0.057*** (0.007)	0.031*** (0.005)	0.054*** (0.007)	0.035*** (0.006)	1709	0.031*** (0.003)	0.014*** (0.003)	0.032*** (0.003)	0.018*** (0.003)	1708
Israel	0.030*** (0.010)	0.037** (0.017)	0.024** (0.010)	0.037 (0.024)	1576	0.009* (0.005)	0.015** (0.007)	0.007 (0.005)	0.014 (0.009)	1538
Spain	0.036*** (0.012)	0.029 (0.019)	0.030** (0.015)	0.038* (0.020)	799	0.016*** (0.004)	0.012** (0.006)	0.012** (0.005)	0.014** (0.006)	760
Portugal	0.062*** (0.019)	0.043*** (0.012)	0.046*** (0.015)	0.041*** (0.011)	802	0.022*** (0.005)	0.016*** (0.004)	0.018*** (0.005)	0.016*** (0.004)	802
Greece	0.027*** (0.009)	0.035*** (0.005)	0.024** (0.010)	0.030*** (0.005)	1413	0.009*** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.008** (0.004)	0.011*** (0.002)	1413
Slovenia	0.055*** (0.014)	0.072*** (0.022)	0.064*** (0.020)	0.055** (0.023)	957	0.018*** (0.005)	0.026*** (0.007)	0.024*** (0.007)	0.021*** (0.006)	970
Czech Republic	0.058** (0.023)	0.074** (0.035)	0.081*** (0.025)	0.091*** (0.030)	831	0.021*** (0.005)	0.036*** (0.008)	0.025*** (0.005)	0.036*** (0.008)	822
Hungary	0.037** (0.014)	0.012* (0.006)	0.022** (0.011)	0.010 (0.007)	1103	0.016*** (0.006)	0.005 (0.003)	0.014*** (0.005)	0.004 (0.004)	1143
Poland	0.077*** (0.011)	0.073*** (0.009)	0.072*** (0.011)	0.071*** (0.009)	1421	0.036*** (0.005)	0.032*** (0.004)	0.035*** (0.005)	0.033*** (0.004)	1423
Total (of 22) Positive Coeff.	22	22	22	22		22	22	22	22	
Total sig. (p<.10)	22	20	22	20		22	20	21	20	
Total sig. if drop (p<.10) <sup>2</sup>	22	21	22	21		21	22	21	21	

1. Probit estimations: coefficients are estimated marginal effects ( $\partial F/\partial x_k$ ), i.e. the marginal effect on  $Pr(y=1)$  given a unit increase in the value of the relevant (continuous) regressor ( $x_k$ ), holding all other regressors at their respective sample means. The discrete change in the probability is reported for binary regressors. Robust standard errors, adjusted for potential regional clustering, in parentheses. \* p<0.10 \*\* p<0.05 \*\*\* p<0.01. Each model includes a full set of regional dummies and covariates of our benchmark model (coefficients not shown here). Cases weighted by DWEIGHT.

2. The last row in the table counts the number of significant coefficients if the *income* variable, the central bottleneck in terms of number of observations for most countries, is replaced by a variable measuring satisfaction with the current level of household income. The latter variable (see text fn. 23 for discussion) yields on average about 20-40% more observations per country

**Figure 1: GDP per capita and the Effect of Education on Attitudes Toward Immigration:**  
 Marginal effects of educational attainment on support for immigration (estimated with regional FE)<sup>1</sup>



Regression equations, robust standard errors in parentheses:

Immigration from Poorer Countries Outside Europe:  $\hat{Y} = 0.035 + 0.000000897 \text{ GDP}$   
 (0.000000879)

Immigration from Richer Countries Outside Europe:  $\hat{Y} = 0.026 + 0.00000146 \text{ GDP}$   
 (0.000000852)

<sup>1</sup> The chart excludes Luxemburg, which is a clear outlier in terms of GDP per capita.